A Sacred Suspicion of Truth; Part 1
We cannot gather truth apart from Belief and Faith, which are the sails that propel our vessel of empirical Truth into the harbors of Knowledge.
There is sense of division in American society. Many people believe it results from a turbulent political climate. That is true to an extent. But most people I meet are apolitical. I must conclude, then, that our disagreements result more from personal and tribal indoctrination than mere political preference and unrest. Societal initiatives, once revered and praised, have taken on a contagion of scorn and disrespect: distortion of language, redefining words, the corruption of biological sex, distain for religion, and a detested dilution of the Christian message. All have become weaponized in overt efforts to bring down the traditional moral order and social structure.
Atheism is gaining in popularity by extolling the virtues of science as the final arbitrator of truth and human understanding. Unlocking the mysteries buried in the furthest reaches of the universe was, in the past, explicable through confidently conjoining science with theistic explanations and religious Faith. The universe was viewed as a masterpiece of comprehensive, immutable design. This means it was structured with intention and purpose which invited us – created beings – to decipher it through Reason. In contrast, modern scientists, who are more atheists than scientists, increasingly convince adherents that religious narratives have been debunked and replaced with naturalistic explanations. What we have readily recognized as universal design has now been established as the product of a mere uneducated illusion.
Richard Dawkins, as the paradigm of blended atheism and science, has gained a lucrative following from an arrogant hatred for God, and a subsequent ego built upon facts of evolutionary biology, which he maintains renders faith and belief obsolete. The lasting effect upon laymen is a diminishing interest in supernatural, and even philosophical, explanations for things that exceed their comprehension. And as knowledge increases, common folks are less likely to accept things that cannot (as they loosely define the term) be proven.
The modern axiom has become ‘to know Nature is to conquer Nature.” With every new scientific discovery, noble insights into religion become superfluous and subsequently discredited. Nature’s prior mysteries are tamed; our awe inspired imagination, fashioned through miracle and mysticism and, by extension, religion and God are supplanted by brute fact. Now I must implore the reader that I have no intention of undermining my own position. I acquired a respect and love for science from a young boy. More appropriately I should call it an insatiable desire to get at the truth of things; guided by the discipline of Clinical Diagnostic Science which I was helpless to capitulate to retirement until 47 years later. To this day I feel blessed to have complimented science with academic level philosophy, which imparts the tactic of observation into three fronts: science, philosophy, and Christianity. I am, as a result, confident that we can recognize when truth has been dropped into our hands; but emphatically deny that science is the only means of putting it there.
Modern science’s insight into reality leans almost exclusively on the epistemological tool called the Scientific method. As a preface to what follows, few are aware that the scientific method, which we anticipate will lead to truth and, therefore, justify discovery, eludes the confirming scientific experimentation required for its own justification. You cannot prove the scientific method by the scientific method. In short, if the scientific method is indeed true, then its truth cannot be established; and should I dare say it? – must be taken on faith. I can tolerate one’s atheism. I can even tolerate one’s arrogance. What I cannot tolerate is one’s visible exercise of faith, while, at the same time, hypocritically denying it. I will posit and strive to show, contrary to Atheistic authoritarianism, that scientific certitude is not always the immutable epitome of truth as frequently conferred upon popular thinking.
Types of “Truths”
I anticipate a possible protest: this is all fine and fancy insider knowledge, you might reply, but it hardly mends matters for the average person. If we cannot place our faith in the scientists themselves, then to whom ought we rightfully turn? In this modern, apparently endless, stream of facts, and the scientific claims extruded from them, how shall the layman confidently endorse their truth? The risk incurred is throwing up one’s hands in frustration, believing the whole affair a vanquished effort. For the layman then, the dangers are a willingness to believe too much or believe too little. Perhaps the only thing more unproductive than doubting nothing at all is to doubt all. You want to know scientific truth and so do I. The question we need to now explore is what justifies a claim, including the Laws of Nature, as being scientifically true? But in order to answer it we must first answer the paramount question: “How do we justify anything as being true?” We need therefore to first look at the process we call Reasoning.
I must begin this discourse by addressing some preliminaries. They may infringe upon you a bit of boredom but if I am to make my case, they are compulsory. Now, since our purpose is of learning how truth is justified, the first thing we must agree upon is what it is. The mind not only apprehends truth in various ways, but there are, also, various kinds of truths. The first is Necessary Truth which must be true in any and every conceivable world. “All snakes are reptiles,” is a Necessary Truth, because in all possible worlds, reptile is, you understand, the very crux of snake. The second, Contingent Truth, will be true in our world but false in some other. An example is the claim, “At sea level, air on earth contains 21% oxygen.” You may conceive a world wherein the inhabitants breath only carbon dioxide and the oxygen content may be 0%. And last, is Possible Truth, which is at least true in some world but not necessarily in our own; examples for which are limited only by the constraints of one’s imagination.
There are also self-evident truths. More specifically, these comprise a category of numerous, vital, propositions called axioms; whose revelation of truths are said to be discerned intuitively. Thus, every logical axiom is a premise so self-evident that no one having but an average mind ever doubted; and “no one with the best mind ever proved.” It is accepted without controversy as true; and should we attempt a proof toward it we should discover feeling no more certain of its truth at the end than at the beginning. It neither requires nor is it conducive to proof but is a means to achieving it. This remarkable faculty of the intuitive mind allows us to immediately recognize certain truths while freely disregarding any process of inference: as they are outside of, and entirely independent of, every logical process. As such, they are often our first comprehensions of what we call truth.
When we observe for the first time that a straight line is the shortest distance between to places, or that two things being equal to a third, are also equal to each other, or that time seems always to flow forward, the mind immediately, that is intuitively, can acquiesce the truth behind them as being self-evident. Any attempt to deny them leads to self-contradiction, which, by the way, most Logicians ascribe as being their distinguishing feature. What I want to stress, even with a bit of irony, is that the first and most elemental means of justifying truth really demands no justification at all. To know, in this sense, is to segregate intuitively, or perhaps better, naturally. The mind’s eye merely sees, perhaps even unconsciously, some truth as being self-evident. For this reason, it is easy to underestimate its essential place in our psyche, but as Lewis reminds us, “If nothing is self-evident nothing can be proved.” We may therefore properly place axioms among the first principles of thought; and by extension, the first principles of Reason.
Judgment of Facts
One last preliminary is so utterly important that I should be terribly remiss not to mention. Judgment is the prerequisite process of perceiving the agreement or disagreement of concepts or ideas and apprehending any possible relation of one to the other. All our acts of judging are, at bottom, an examination and comparison of at least two concepts, or what we readily call facts. Now science is of course teaming with facts: we have astronomical facts, evolutionary facts; geographic, chemical, medical, environmental, cosmic, statistical, and physical facts; even facts about other facts. But it is a sheer impossibility at any time, concerning any subject, to ascertain truth or falsehood from facts alone.
A collection of 2-million-year-old hominoid bones are facts: but this simple testimony provides no education about hominids or bones. The Einsteinium equations of Relativity Theory are facts: should they fail to predict events observed in space-time, I will have learned nothing about light or gravity, and thus nothing about space-time. An accelerating universe, for example, may be a brute fact: but acceleration without a mechanism of some force or energy as a cause behind it leaves out the very thing needed to give it meaning. If there is one emphatic fact, it is that facts alone are of no more service to truth than unsowed seed is to a bountiful alfalfa pasture. Until judgment links at least two facts, concepts, or hypotheticals in some form of agreement or disagreement, reason, and hence, knowledge eludes us. In the fond admonishment of Logicians, “the mind cannot think at all without judging; to think is to judge.” Judgment provides a delegate balance between what we know and what we can only imagine.
We agree then that the mind cannot think without judging, which implies there will be no judgment unless there is already some mental material to judge. The alternative is a bag of trivial, empirical facts wonderfully indulged though never suffice to inspire scientific progress. A passing example of the madness to which otherwise rational minds are driven through neglect of judgment, is the modern perturbation of climate change. The inarguable and brute fact (assuming it is inarguable) that the average temperature during the past century as risen one degree means little to nothing unless someone knows, and tells, what the global temperature ought to be. We have the facts and can handily compare them – those from some past, arbitrary date and those concerning the present average temperature calculated from that date. That one number is higher than the other is straight away factual evidence: facts for which a multitude of claims are constrained only by one’s courage to stake his name and sanity.
But to what will he say the comparison of temperatures agree or disagree? Will he say to our beneficence, our detriment, or to our pure indifference? And upon what input of data are useful predictions of future temperatures dependent? For as I understand it, were identical statistical methods applied but restricted to the past decade, we should learn that the average global temperature has actually decreased a degree and half compared to the previous decade. The point is, in the absence of other knowledge - knowing what the optimal ought to be- any critical analysis through comparison can never determine whether things are improving or deteriorating. One can, I suppose, interpret the optimal as any condition, in so far as it is one that avoids certain disaster, and evidently keeps the globe free of massive crop depletion, floods, and pandemic heat stroke or frostbite. Why all the bother with facts?
But this is a digression into what shall, sadly, remain unsuitably addressed until it is removed from the stage of “political theatrics”; and so, I return to more pressing concerns. Scientific facts, therefore, must be interpreted; and clearly this interpretation is merely one’s subjective tale. Any assurance we are willing to afford them cannot end there. We must first insist that our consent depends on how effectively one can harmonize that interpretation with the reality given by the facts. The more perfect one’s judgment, in general, the more accuracy it incurs upon one’s interpretation. And when our interpretation is at its best, it becomes an echo of what was and a whisper of what might be in a future state of affairs.
Reasoning: Deductive and Inductive
And with this I conclude the preliminary considerations. It may be helpful to suggest that you give your undivided attention to what follows. To grasp this is to enjoy smooth sailing for the remainder of my argument. Now Logicians tell us there are two great classes of Reasoning: Deductive Reasoning and Inductive Reasoning. Deductive reasoning allows us to discover, or better, to infer, particular truths from previously assumed general truths. It is the form of Reasoning frequently used in mathematics and logic itself and is concerned with necessary truths. When our propositions are joined together as a chain of reasoning which begins with a general truth, we are said to be engaged in a deductive argument. In this way the process intrinsically descends from some higher truth to the conclusion of a lower. Though there are various forms of deductive reasoning, a frequent and natural expression takes the form of a Syllogism; and any student of elementary logic will immediately recognize the following as a classic example:
(a) All men are mortal (major premise)
(b) Socrates is a man (minor premise)
(c) Therefore, Socrates is mortal (conclusion)
Given the general truths (a) “All men are mortal”, called the major premise; and (b) “Socrates is a man”, called the minor premise, we are able to infer the particular truth (c) that “Socrates is mortal.” For any deductive argument, having a similar chain of reasoning, the moment we learn the first two facts the third fact is deduced from them as the conclusion. That is of course, presuming that our argument meets the criteria for deductive reasoning. Our argument must be valid; meaning that the conclusion must logically follow from the premise. It must also be true, which demands that the propositions be consistent with the facts they describe. And when we are satisfied that it is both valid and true, we say that our Reasoning is sound.
We note with interest, that if we are to Reason deductively, we must already have some knowledge with which to begin the process. Unless we bring for consideration the general truth (one universally agreed) that “All men are mortal”, we should never be able to state with certainty that “Socrates is mortal.” Every major premise is assumed to be true: if it happens to be an axiom, we are all the more comfortable with that assumption. It is highly significant to discover that deductive reasoning will not create truth. It will however allow you to gather the truth contained in some proposition, the premise, and impart that truth into another proposition called the conclusion. In essence, we learn that a given claim is true when some other claim coming before it is true. To Reason from a general truth, is to get some knowledge form other knowledge.
And this matter of prior knowledge extends even further and deeper back. For without it, we impoverish our confidence that our conclusions really are true. Clearly then, the essential, primary foundation of deductive reasoning is the logical axiom, “Whatever is true of the general is true of the particular.” Or, as it is sometimes rendered, “Whatever is true of the whole is true of the parts.” What must be incontrovertibly understood is that the axiom cannot be derived from the process of deductive reasoning, because it alone is the very starting point for it. The axiom necessary at the start also affords confidence in the validity of our Reasoning at the end. If we are challenged to provide proof for the claim “Socrates is mortal”, we find justification by merely pointing to the axiom, “Whatever is true of the general is also true of the particular.” So, in general all men being mortal; and Socrates being a particular man among them, then, upon the authority of the axiom, we rightly conclude Socrates must also be mortal. Thus, we learn that a second method for justifying truth is seeing that our conclusions are in concert with our axioms.
But where, you may ask, do the general truths come from? Well, some come from axioms of mathematics, others from logical axioms, and still others from logical argumentation. Apart from axioms, there are general truths in the form of scientific law, theory, and hypothesis. All are laid down through the process of Inductive Reasoning, which is the cornerstone of the scientific method in its quest for objective truth.
Inductive Reasoning
To reason inductively is to start from particular facts in hopes of arriving at general laws, that is to say, it proceeds from particular truths to universal truths. In this way it contrasts with deductive reasoning. Induction allows us to reason form effect to cause and is, by its nature, restricted to contingent truths; which explains why the natural sciences rely upon it in the investigation of causal relations. The scientist may examine within a system a sufficient number of events; and then by induction conclude that events not yet observed will conform to the same general law. Once the general law has been cultivated, and after the major premise has been formed, deductive reasoning is then employed to predict the next instance of the event or the object. An illustration of induction follows. It has been our experience that all observed emeralds are green; and from this experience we conclude that in general all emeralds must be green or, in the very least, at the next observable instance we will see a green emerald. This general pattern will always take the form:
(1) Every observed P (emerald) has also been Q (green).
(2) Therefore, all P (emeralds) are Q (Green; including those not observed).
Now all this seems a brilliant piece of simplicity; but upon closer inspection the conclusion seems rather premature. Though our experience has it that every observed emerald thus far has been green, it does not logically follow that all emeralds, including the next one observed, must be green. This conclusion will only be valid were we able to confirm through observation that any and every emerald is in fact green. But, of course, since our experiences are obviously limited, such a conclusion would seem rather impossible. Thus, the argument is logically invalid; and should you accept it, you will be accepting a general conclusion which is, therefore, unjustified. The conclusion can never be guaranteed in this world or any other; it is logically inconsistent because it goes beyond the facts admitted by the premise. We are confronted with an unusual sort of paradox: We are comfortable in presupposing that future events will be disclosed in the same fashion as they have in the past, though we can find no justification for doing so. And this suggests something immensely disturbing: if science is necessarily grounded in inductive reasoning, in reality it must accept general propositions on the basis of invalid arguments!
This problem has for so long shattered our confidence in inductive reason, that someone, at some time, found it fitting to call it the Problem of Induction. Philosophy has been hampered by it for eons; and in quite modern times is now the proverbial monkey of unobserved matters of fact on the back of science. I shall attempt to explain its implications as best I can; and I implore the reader that comprehension is imperative if we are to settle the question we initially set out to answer: what justifies a scientific claim as true? So, I must ask the reader to be a bit more precise because, of course, one can never suitably address a technical problem in non-technical fashion.
The Problem of Induction
Right from the gait, we will observe that the problem is not in this particular argument alone but is inherent in the inductive process itself; thus, no inductive argument is free from this unique debilitation. The foremost implication is that our past experiences cannot lawfully, that is, logically justify our conviction that events for which we have no experience must resemble those for which we have. But you may say that experience tells us, for example, that every snowball is cold, and it is quite common sense to expect the next snowball formed (even 20 winters from now) will also be cold. Logical or not, you insist, it is a blatant, indisputable conclusion that all snowballs are cold: it is simply an unspoken connection between the past and the future made by our minds! And you will be right. We do in fact make inductive inferences in this way and seem to get on well in predicting the future.
Although the conclusion is invalid, it is, nevertheless, confidently accepted. This is evidence that we do in fact make an unspoken, causal connection between it and the initial premise. Not only are we mentally supplying a connecting premise, but such a premise is implicitly presumed for every case of inductive reasoning! Let us, for the moment, call this premise the “inductive principle.” As an aid to applying it, and for convenience, I remind the reader that our purpose when reasoning inductively is to draw the conclusion, “Whatever is true of the particular is also true of the universal.”
In essence the inductive principle asserts that what is true in our experiences (since P are Q holds true) is always true in nature generally. Therefore, all P are Q is true for the entire universe! Now, our hope is that this unspoken, inductive principle will guarantee that past experiences truly are indicators for the future; that similar effects always come from similar causes anywhere in the universe. Hume called this the Principle of Uniformity of Nature from which comes our assurance that even the Laws of Physics apply equally to things we have observed as well as to things we have not. All that is now required is to insert it into our argument above and the problem of induction is resolved. Whether or not we may rightly accept our conclusion as valid now depends only on whether we are willing to accept as logical the Principle of the Uniformity of Nature.
(1) Every observed P (emerald) has also been Q (green).
* Unspoken connective: “What is true in our experience is also true in nature generally.”
(2) Therefore, all P (emeralds) are Q (green) (even those not observed).
But the instance it is inserted we come head-on with the problem of induction. Far from being a remedy, it makes the entire matter logically worse. We quickly discover that the Principle of Uniformity of Nature itself concerns unobserved matters of fact. Facts of which we can neither directly experience nor observe. The premise that Nature is uniform – that what is true in our experiences is always true in nature generally- is nothing less than what we set out to prove in the first place! Suddenly, our entire method explicitly fails leaving us with nothing more than an invalid, circular argument.
At this point it appears that the Principle of Uniformity of Nature itself can only find justification from an inductive argument. But this is surly absurd: the principle itself is a premise presupposed in every inductive argument and, as such, can never be proved through induction. And so, we discover that we cannot even establish an inductive argument unless we first assume a premise which itself can never be proven inductively! Our position is a bit like being informed of a pot of diamonds for which you need only to retrieve by following a map but is itself hid away in the pot of diamonds. To understand this is to understand the problem of induction. And, as it were, led to madness.
About me:
I am a retired Clinical Diagnostic Scientist, a Registered Nurse, and a life-long student of philosophy.
Heuristic Critiques is a collection of essays directed at restoring sanity to a number of leading, corrupted ideologies: politics, education and epistemology, religion and Faith, morality, language, reason and logic, transgenderism and gender identity, Wokeism, and Critical Race Theory. Topics examined are undergirded by my conviction that we exist within an objective, natural reality which is practically and logically independent of human minds, social interaction, and social constructs.
We cannot gather truth apart from Belief and Faith, which are the sails that propel our vessel of empirical Truth into the harbors of Knowledge.